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Bohr held that quantum mechanical symbols find meaning only in the context of an 
experimental setting. Making a measurement requires establishing a correspondence between 
a property of the quantum object and a property of the measuring system via the 
introduction of a classical quantity with which the measuring instrument, classically 
understood, interacts. However, this correspondence is only approximate and involves the 
use of certain idealizations, and it is the commutation rules that tell us the limitations to this 
process.  In this context I examine the caution by Daumer, et. al. (1996) against taking too 
seriously the idea of operators as observables. I conclude that Bohr would neither ascribe to 
such ‘naive realism’ about operators nor dismiss the formalism as unimportant to the 
understanding of quantum phenomena, although he would agree with the caution that the 
properties we can attribute to a system depend on the context of the experiment. 
Introductory comments 
My goal for this paper is to take some steps towards a new analysis of Bohr’s views on quantum 
mechanics based on close look at the philosophical content of his work on atomic theory in the early 
1920s.  I argue that the main key to understanding Bohr’s otherwise confusing (or complex and 
“subtle”) explications of his philosophy is a re-consideration of the meaning and role of his 
correspondence principle in his approach to quantum theory.  For Bohr, the correspondence 
principle was not merely a heuristic tool for the development of quantum theory; nor was it primarily 
concerned with the asymptotic agreement between classical and quantum theory.  Rather, its main 
purpose was to connect theory-laden descriptions of phenomena with a developing theory of atomic 
structure—it was meant to bridge the epistemological gap between empirical phenomena and 
theory.  And I will argue that Bohr maintained the need for such a tool in his interpretation of 
quantum mechanics.  I am going to provide this picture of Bohr in the context of an issue raised by 
Goldstein (Daumer, Dürr et al. 1996) in the 1996 PSA conference concerning the meaning of 
quantum mechanical operators, where the authors of the presented paper argue against taking too 
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seriously the standard quantum mechanical formalism and claim that Bohr himself pointed out some 
of the central theses of their argument.  A comparison between Bohr and the Bohmian view 
presented in that paper will help clarify Bohr’s argument that our ability to make meaningful 
statements about quantum systems depends on classical physics and a complete description of the 
experimental context, and in particular will help us understand the way in which Bohr relates these 
conditions to the meaning of the quantum formalism. 
Naïve realism 
In the paper presented by Goldstein at the 1996 PSA, Daumer et al. blamed what they call “naïve 
realism about operators” for the “contortions and perversions” of many interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. They argue, from a Bohmian perspective, that we ought not take too seriously the idea 
of “operator-as-observable” because this leads to our treating operators as representing actual 
properties of the system.  It is only once one accepts the idea that quantum systems have properties 
corresponding to each operator that one has to explain what happens to those properties when they 
are not being measured.  Daumer et al. argue that rather than treating operators as representing 
independent properties of a quantum system, we ought to understand them only as something like 
emergent properties of the entire experimental arrangement.1   
Of course, from their Bohmian perspective, the only real property is position.  Other so-called 
“properties” emerge from the wave equation representing the interaction of the particle with the 
apparatus.  That is, these properties are “merely in the wave function,” (1996, 389) although they 
                                                 
1  They take their inspiration from Bell, who argued partly for these reasons that the word “measurement” should be 
banished from our vocabulary regarding quantum mechanics.  Bell himself refers to Bohr as having taught us that 
properties must be taken to apply to the whole system plus apparatus complex and as such only pertain to a particular 
experimental arrangement.  Daumer et al. extend this critique of the meaning of the quantum mechanical formalism and 
argue that the idea of operator-as-observable (i.e., naïve realism about operators) is perhaps even more pernicious than 
the idea of “measurement”. 
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caution even against this terminology, for they argue that we cannot simply make the move of 
attributing the property to the wave function instead of the particle, since the wave function is a 
specific “extremely complicated function” intimately tied to a particular experiment, and different 
experimental arrangements for what we may tend to think of as the same property may have 
“entirely different functions.” (389)  Thus, we ought not even think of this operator as a general 
property—rather, it is a function appropriate only for this particular experiment: 
The fact that the same operator plays a role in different experiments does not imply that these 
experiments have much else in common, and certainly not that they involve measurements of the 
same thing.  It is thus with detailed experiments, and not with the associated operators, that 
random variables might reasonably be expected to be associated. (391) 
Now, since we ought not treat operators as representing properties, then the non-commutativity 
between incompatible operators does not inform us at all about the nature of the properties of a 
quantum system.  It can only tell us something about experimental arrangements, as Daumer et al. 
indicate in this remark about no-go theorems: 
 The state of affairs described by the [no-go] theorems nonetheless logically implies the obvious 
conclusion, namely, that the incompatible joint values refer to different, and incompatible, 
experimental set-ups, just as Bohr told us all along. This mathematical incompatibility of “joint 
values” thus seems to attain genuine significance only to the extent that we are seduced by naive 
realism about operators. (391)   
That is, we ought not take this formalism as an indication of the incompatibility of the actual or 
possible properties of a quantum system. 
I would like to suggest that a truly Bohrian approach offers a middle ground that does not 
commit the alleged sins of naïve realism but also legitimates the attribution of properties 
corresponding to operators to a system.  However, it does so by treating the classically-defined 
properties we attribute to a system as approximate idealized descriptions of the actual properties of 
that system in interaction with a particular experimental apparatus.  As I suggested, the key to 
understanding Bohr’s views of quantum mechanics is his correspondence principle. 
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The correspondence principle 
Bohr’s approach to the development of quantum theory was empirically driven.  He attempted to 
use phenomena as a more secure starting point for the development of theory and searched for the 
most general features that any atomic theory was to have in the face of the novel introduction of 
quantum effects.  Thus Bohr attempted to determine atomic structure from the properties of the 
radiation in the spectra, even in the absence of an understanding of the quantum mechanism for the 
emission of that radiation.  Bohr described conclusions reached through this method as “empirical 
deductions from the spectral evidence.” (1924b, 224: BCW 3, 579) 
This approach assumed a sort of epistemological split between empirical phenomena and the 
atomic structure responsible for those phenomena and explicitly required a tool to allow one to 
bridge the gap between phenomena and theory.  The correspondence principle was this tool, which 
together with Bohr’s frequency condition (∆E=hν) acted as a bridge principle that let one make 
claims about atomic structure based on empirical phenomena and then let one deduce the empirical 
consequences of the model.2   
The correspondence principle was based on the idea that the classical relationship between the 
wave properties of radiation and the oscillations of electrons in the atom must hold in its general 
terms.  It was “a connection between the spectrum and the atomic model of hydrogen” (1920, 26: 
BCW 3, 249) which allowed one to reach conclusions about the oscillations of electrons in orbits.  
The relata of the correspondence principle were epistemologically distinct: on the one side were 
empirical generalizations of spectral phenomena and on the other were the properties of atomic 
structure responsible for those phenomena. 
                                                 
2  For example, one of the simplest and very first of these arguments was the way Bohr derived energy levels from the 
Balmer formula. 
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More specifically, the correspondence principle connected the frequencies of radiation in an 
atomic spectra with the Fourier components of the motion of an electron in an orbit.  That is, while 
classically the motion of an electron in an orbit would simultaneously emit light in the frequencies of 
each of the Fourier components of its motion, the correspondence principle held that in a transition 
between stationary states the light emitted (or absorbed) would correspond in its properties to only 
one of these harmonics, which one depending on the difference between the quantum numbers of 
the states: 
On account of the general correspondence between the spectrum of an atom and the decomposition of its 
motions into harmonic components, we are led to compare the radiation emitted during the transition 
between two stationary states with the radiation which would be emitted by a harmonically 
oscillating electron on the basis of the classical electrodynamics. (1920, 51: BCW 3, 273) (emphasis 
added) 
One has this access to the motion through the comparison the correspondence principle legitimates 
between the quantum emission of radiation through state transitions and the classical account of the 
emission process.3  The correspondence principle let Bohr reach conclusions about the types of 
orbits that were allowed, what types of transitions between were allowed, and the effects on the 
orbits and transition possibilities from external forces.  And while its quantitative application worked 
best only for states of high quantum number, Bohr maintained that at least qualitative properties 
could be connected for states of low quantum number, and held out hope that a more quantitative 
relationship could be found.   
Matrix mechanics was, for Bohr, the solidification and clarification of this entire approach: 
In brief, the whole apparatus of the quantum mechanics can be regarded as a precise formulation 
of the tendencies embodied in the correspondence principle. (1925, 852: BCW 5, 280) 4 
                                                 
3  This idea that the correspondence principle was primarily a connection between spectra and orbital motion, and not 
between classical and quantum theory in some more abstract sense, has not been entirely missed but has been generally 
overlooked.  Two notable exceptions are Darrigol’s (1992) historical treatment of Bohr’s correspondence principle, and 
Tomonaga’s (1962) textbook which takes seriously Bohr’s ideas about correspondence.  
4  Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan made a similar claim in their 1926 paper, calling matrix mechanics “an exact formulation 
of Bohr’s correspondence considerations” (Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan 1926; van der Waerden 1968, 322) 
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Matrix mechanics fulfilled the promise of the correspondence principle not merely in its retention of 
the forms of classical equations, but more fundamentally in the fact that it used and solidified the 
connection the correspondence principle had provided between empirical properties and the atom: 
[Matrix mechanics] operates with manifolds of quantities, which replace the harmonic oscillating 
components of the motion and symbolize the possibilities of transitions between stationary states 
in conformity with the correspondence principle. (1925, 852: BCW 5, 280)  
The matrices are built out of elements which “symbolize” the oscillators that the correspondence 
principle connected to the spectral lines.  The Fourier components of motion are retained but are no 
longer assumed to build up any classical orbital motion.  The question now is how we are to 
understand this new formalism.   
Idealizations 
Bohr’s interpretation of the new formalism explicitly concerned the use of classical theory as 
necessary idealizations.  So let me take a moment to briefly address Bohr’s attitude to idealizations 
before 1925.  Bohr had always believed that there were limitations to use of the use of the 
correspondence principle and that these limitations were associated with the approximate 
applicability of idealizations.  One of the most important postulates of his quantum theory had been 
the postulate of stationary states.  Yet he explicitly admitted that this postulate was not universally 
applicable but rather, it was an idealization whose use was justified only in very specific situations. 
And this applicability of the stationary state postulate was determined using classical physics.  
Bohr claimed that in order to apply quantum theory to the atom, we must be able to make 
the assumption that the motion within the stationary states can be described, to a close 
approximation, by the laws of ordinary electrodynamics, if only one neglects the reaction connected 
with the emission of radiation. (1924a, 2: BCW 3, 459) 
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Classical electrodynamics is clearly inconsistent with the concept of stationary states, because the 
reaction on the electron from the emission of light would lead to a decay of the orbit.  However, we 
can still use it, but we can only use it, for those cases when according to classical physics the change 
in motion on the electron from the emission of radiation is small compared to the changes in 
motion from the forces within the atom—that is, its applicability is limited to those cases where we 
may in the classical account ignore to a first approximation the forces which correspond to the 
unknown quantum mechanism of radiation: 
In all processes to which quantum theory has been applied, the radiation which, according to the 
classical theory, is emitted during a period (a revolution of the electron) is but small.  Hence, it is a 
very natural assumption that, in calculating the stationary states, we may neglect the influence of the 
radiation upon the motion …. We emphasize, however, that such a procedure represents only an 
approximation … (1922: BCW 4, 352)  
The use of the correspondence principle was valid only under certain specifiable conditions, and 
even then provided for only a good approximation.  And one determined whether the idealization 
was an appropriate approximation or not by examining the degree to which the classical physics 
used to ground the idealization was applicable.   
The main point I want to make here is that our ability to attribute properties to the atom or to 
an electron in the atom depended on the degree to which we could approximately describe them 
with classical physics, and we in turn determined this degree on the basis of classical reasoning, 
although it was classical reasoning in the quantum context.  Only when these conditions are met 
may we appropriately declare empirical phenomena to be evidence of the otherwise hidden 
properties of the atom; even then, the claims that we do make are only approximate, as our use of 
these concepts involves idealizations that do not strictly apply to the atom.  This understanding of 
how Bohr approached quantum theory can help us understand what Bohr later meant with 
complementarity.  Let me turn to this topic now.   
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Mutual exclusivity and the limitations of the correspondence connection 
 
Bohr’s introduction of complementarity involved the claim that results of measurements be given in 
classical terms which apply only to mutually exclusive experimental arrangements—i.e., that we can 
neither perform one experiment to measure two incompatible properties, nor perform two different 
experiments measuring incompatible properties in succession and treat it as one experiment which 
measured both.  But it’s not so clear what his argument for this mutual exclusivity was.  Bohr 
claimed that our descriptions of experimental results involve a “neglect of quantum effects” and that 
the source of these “incontrollable” effects is the so-called “quantum of action” which we express in 
the quantum postulate.  But Bohr also claimed that the only way the quantum postulate comes into 
the quantum mechanical formalism is through the commutation relations.  In fact, Bohr clearly 
understood the uncertainty relations as “a direct consequence of the commutation rules.” (1939, 18: 
BCW 7, 310)   
I claim that despite the appearances of his predominately classical explications of 
complementarity, Bohr’s argument for complementarity cannot be based merely on analyses from 
outside the quantum formalism.  Rather, complementarity fundamentally relies on this formalism: 
In fact, the limited commutability of the symbols by which … variables are represented in the 
quantal formalism correspond to the mutual exclusion of the experimental arrangements required 
for their unambiguous definition. (1958, 312: BCW 7, 392) 
Bohr thought that it is only through this formalism that we learn that the experiments are mutually 
exclusive.   
Now what exactly is being limited in this mutual exclusivity?  Bohr claimed that the quantum 
mechanical formalism was by itself merely abstract symbolism without connection to actual 
measurements.  The way in which matrix mechanics is related to the correspondence principle 
indicates that the formalism receives its empirical content via a type of correspondence connection 
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between empirical phenomena and quantum properties.  However, this connection is limited, and 
outside an empirical context the quantum properties are now considered to be entirely abstract, as is 
the case for the components of the position matrix.   
It is only through this process of attributing the corresponding classical properties to the 
quantum system that we can give the abstract symbols empirical meaning.  The meaning of the 
symbols comes in the way in which we describe the interaction between the system and the 
measuring apparatus in classically-defined terms: 
We must recognize that a measurement can mean nothing else than the unambiguous comparison 
of some property of the object under investigation with a corresponding property of another 
system, serving as a measuring instrument, and for which this property is directly determinable 
according to its definition in everyday language or in the terminology of classical physics.  (1939, 19: 
BCW 7, 311)  
Making a measurement requires making a comparison between some property of the quantum 
object and some property of the measuring system.  One makes this comparison by establishing a 
correspondence between the quantum mechanical symbol representing some property of the object 
and a classical quantity with which the measuring instrument, classically understood, interacts.  This 
outside description of the classical behavior of the apparatus establishes what Bohr calls the 
“external conditions” of the phenomena—in the absence of these conditions the quantum symbols 
have no empirical content. 
In a particular situation, a quantum symbol receives an essentially classical empirical meaning 
based on its role in the classical equations used for the description of the experiment, yet we cannot 
attribute the actual classical meaning to this symbol in general. Since the quantum properties of the 
object are not the same as their classical counterparts—at the very least they are not the same in 
their relations to one another—this process involves approximations or idealizations, and the 
commutation rules tell us the limitations to this process. Thus while we may be able to establish a 
correspondence with a classical idealization in a given empirical setting, this process inherently 
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ignores quantum effects, and so requires that we ignore other aspects of the system not directly 
involved in the measurement.  Given the quantum interaction between a system and the measuring 
instruments,5 our ability to attribute properties to the system in the context of an experimental 
arrangement depends on our ability to neglect this interaction and independently describe the 
“external conditions” of the entire quantum phenomenon.   
The correspondence principle had argued that certain elements of the asymptotic agreement 
between classical and quantum theory could hold in general and would thus allow us to bridge the 
epistemological gap between empirical phenomena and atomic properties.  We knew that there were 
limitations to this process and that this correspondence agreement worked best only under certain 
specific circumstances.  Now we find that some of these conclusions are still valid, but we have 
learned that the conditions for assuming that general correspondence do not hold simultaneously.  
For example, while we may still understand the quantum symbols in terms of representing an orbit 
or a definite stationary state, we learn from the commutation relations that the classical conditions 
determining the validity of these idealizations are mutually exclusive.   
This argument is directly connected to the formalism, which Bohr understood as an outgrowth 
of the application of the correspondence principle:  
In particular is the essentially statistical nature of this account a direct consequence of the fact that 
the commutation rules prevent us to identify at any instant more than a half of the symbols 
representing the canonical variables with definite values of the corresponding classical quantities.  
(1939, 14-15: BCW 7, 306-307) 
It is only in virtue of the commutation relations that we learn the limitations of our ability to 
connect the symbols representing quantum properties to the corresponding classical properties we 
take our instruments to measure.  Complementarity is the consequence of this situation, and not 
something new added to the interpretation from the outside.   
                                                 
5  I believe that Don Howard’s (1990; 1994) take on Bohr’s understanding of this interaction in terms of entanglement is 
illuminating and perhaps the right way to understand Bohr. 
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Formalism, empirical content, and naïve realism 
Bohr’s view is thus consistent with the caution against naïve realism, as he does not take the specific 
idealized property that we attribute to a system in a particular experimental arrangement to be a 
universal or independent property of the system.  Rather, it depends on the specifics of the 
apparatus, where the operator only gains content in an empirical setting is dependent on the entire 
experimental arrangement.  We need to use classical reasoning to fix the external empirical 
conditions which then fix the appropriate equations governing the symbols.  This is how we actually 
do determine quantum expressions, as we in general start with classical equations and then 
“quantize” them.  The basis for this process begins outside the theory proper—the formalism of 
quantum mechanics does not on its own provide the recipe for this process, and so the application 
of the theory to any particular experimental arrangement depends on conceptual apparatus external 
to the theory—i.e., it depends on classical physics.   
But Bohr would not accept the idea that the quantum operators ought not be considered to 
represent properties of the system under measurement.  When we attribute a property such as 
position to the system as an idealized approximation, it is meant to serve exactly as that—an 
approximation of the unvisualizable properties in virtue of which the system is behaving as if it has a 
classically well-defined position.  It is not classical position in its complete sense, because we know, 
for example, that the limitation of this idealized description indicates that the reaction of the system 
to a momentum measurement will not be the same as if it retained the classical position.  Yet the 
point of this process is to capture as many as possible of the salient features of the quantum system 
in the experiment even though we cannot account for whatever it is about the quantum of action 
that limits our ability to maintain this coincidence outside the context of this experiment. 
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I would like to provide the following breakdown of the differences between the Bohmian 
caution against naïve realism and what I suggest would be Bohr’s view on this topic: 
 
 
 
Attitudes Regarding Naïve Realism 
 
 Bohmian Bohrian 
operators not to be understood as 
properties 
empirical content depends on “external 
conditions” 
properties position only idealizations & approximate  
contextuality at best, other “properties” apply 
only to entire experimental 
interaction 
idealizations apply only in context of 
particular experiment 
mutual 
exclusivity and 
incompatibility 
apply only to experimental 
arrangements 
express limitations to the applicability 
of idealized properties 
role of classical 
physics 
metaphysical in retention of 
position and determinism 
empirical in the idealized description of 
quantum properties 
& the determination of the 
approximate applicability of 
idealizations  
epistemology precise position “hidden” access to properties through 
approximate correspondence  
 
While Bohr does argue that quantum properties are contextual and therefore probably would agree 
with the caution against taking too simplistically the idea of operator-as-observable, he would not go 
so far as to dismiss the formalism and declare that operators do not represent quantum properties at 
all.  Rather, I argue, the Bohrian view is that the idealizations used for the process of describing 
measurements are appropriate for that context and do capture (albeit incompletely) important 
aspects of the properties of the system.  Note, too, the different role classical physics plays in the 
two approaches: while in Bohmian mechanics it plays a sort of metaphysical role in maintaining 
determinism and in universally setting position as the principle property, for Bohr the role of 
classical physics is empirical.  Classical physics is used in determining the empirical meaning of the 
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quantum symbols by allowing us to establish a connection between quantum properties and the 
classically-defined properties we take our measuring instruments to measure; moreover, it allows us 
to determine the validity of the idealizations that are used in this process.  Classical physics thus 
helps us determine which of the quantum properties are being “picked out” in any particular 
experiment. 
That is, the Bohrian view is that we can attribute to the system an idealized, approximate 
classical description of the properties represented by the quantum symbolism.  Quantum effects are 
evident only in the relations between incompatible idealizations, and it is only through these 
commutation relations that we know that these properties are incompatible.  The formalism is thus 
fundamentally important to the Bohrian view in a way it would not be if properties were taken to be 
merely epiphenomenal or operational.  In the latter cases, the formalism merely expresses facts 
about experimental arrangements and nothing interesting about quantum properties themselves.  
Yet because the Bohrian view allows that we can attribute properties into to the quantum system 
with appropriate reasoning, the commutation relations express a fact about both the success and 
limitations of the attribution of idealized properties to quantum systems.  To interpret quantum 
mechanics, one needs both to understand the way in which non-commutativity and incompatibility is 
expressed in the formalism and to understand how the formalism is connected to empirical 
situations. 
Complementarity thus reflects how this approximate correspondence between quantum and 
classical properties in one empirical situation relates to the approximate correspondence one can 
establish in another.  The abstract formalism of quantum mechanics expresses these relationships 
and indeed demonstrates how different sets of classical quantities are incompatible, but the whole 
story about complementarity requires an account of the connection of this formalism to the various 
classical descriptions.  
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